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The First Anti-Sanctuary Law: 
Proposition 187 and the 
Transformation of Immigration 
Enforcement 
Rick Su* 
Anti-sanctuary efforts are sweeping the country, as the federal 
government and a growing number of states impose stringent restrictions 
on the ability of cities and other localities to limit their involvement in 
federal immigration enforcement. Many are now wondering how far this 
movement will go. But where and how did this movement begin? This Essay 
argues that the roots of the contemporary anti-sanctuary movement can be 
traced to Proposition 187, a ballot initiative adopted by California voters in 
1994. As the nation’s first anti-sanctuary law, Proposition 187 established 
the basic provisions featured in nearly every anti-sanctuary measure 
enacted since. Moreover, it led the federal government to reshape federal 
law and initiatives to enable the kind of federal-local cooperation that 
Proposition 187 envisioned. As a result, Proposition 187 did more than 
simply set the groundwork for the modern anti-sanctuary movement. It also 
led to a restructuring of the federalism relationship that made the 
proliferation of anti-sanctuary legislation like Proposition 187 more 
necessary. In other words, although Proposition 187 is largely remembered 
as a benefit-restricting measure, it is its anti-sanctuary efforts that 
constitute its most lasting legacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2017, California enacted SB 54, a “sanctuary” law that 
prohibits state and local officials from participating in federal 
immigration enforcement.1 Exceptions were provided in certain cases.2 
But as only the second state to pass such a measure,3 California was 
widely recognized as a vanguard in resisting the federal government’s 
escalating interior enforcement efforts. Immigration advocates 
immediately lauded the law as a model. The federal government quickly 
filed suit to challenge its constitutionality.4 All the while, SB 54 stood 
out as a counterpoint to the wave of anti-sanctuary measure sweeping 
the country.5 While several states have enacted laws to compel the 
participation of local officials in federal immigration enforcement in 
recent years, California was now mandating that they refuse.  
But if California is now leading the charge on sanctuary, it was also a 
pioneer in the anti-sanctuary movement that it now opposes. Indeed, in 
the 1990s, long before the political battle over sanctuary policies 
dominated the national debate, California enacted the nation’s first anti-
sanctuary law. Local officials were required to “fully cooperate” with 
the federal government.6 They were mandated to take affirmative steps 
to verify the legal status of immigrants, and report those found 
unauthorized to the federal government.7 Local sanctuary policies were 
also explicitly prohibited.8 That law was Proposition 187.9 It was 
enacted as a ballot initiative in 1994 with the support of nearly sixty 
percent of California voters.10 And I argue in this Essay that it reshaped 
our nation’s approach to immigration enforcement, and ultimately gave 
rise to the sanctuary debates that now dominate immigration politics. 
 
 1 See SB 54, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 2 See id. § 2. 
 3 Illinois was the first state to pass a statewide sanctuary bill, also in 2017. See 
Illinois TRUST Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 805/15 (2017). 
 4 See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 5 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 837, 839-40 (2019).  
 6 See Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification 
and Reporting (1994), at § 4(a). 
 7 See id. § 4(b). 
 8 See id. § 4(c). 
 9 See generally id. 
 10 See BILL JONES, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, at xxv (1994). 
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Much has been written about Proposition 187. And despite the fact 
that it was never enforced — initially blocked by a court injunction11 
and later abandoned by elected officials12 — it has long served as a 
cautionary tale. For some, the story is one of political backlash, and 
what can happen when the issue of immigration is cast through the lens 
of race, criminality, and the welfare state.13 For others, it is an account 
of political transition, and how one law tipped a traditionally 
Republican state into becoming a Democratic stronghold.14 In both 
tellings, the focus is on how Proposition 187 sought to deny 
unauthorized immigrants access to the state’s social services, emergency 
healthcare, and its public schools and universities.15 What has largely 
been overlooked is how Proposition 187 sought to compel state and 
local involvement in immigration enforcement, and did so by denying 
state and local officials the ability to limit their participation.  
This Essay is a reexamination of Proposition 187 as an anti-sanctuary 
law. At the most basic level, it shines light on the enforcement mandates 
and sanctuary prohibitions that have become common features in 
nearly every anti-sanctuary measure that has been adopted since 
Proposition 187’s introduction. But more importantly, this Essay argues 
that Proposition 187 advanced a new model of immigration 
enforcement based on federal-local cooperation. This new model would 
eventually be embraced by the federal government, resulting in federal 
reforms that both supported and enabled the kind of coordinated 
enforcement that Proposition 187 proposed. In doing so, however, the 
federal response to Proposition 187 also made laws like Proposition 187 
more important to federal immigration enforcement efforts, thus 
leading to the wave of anti-sanctuary laws that are now proliferating at 
the state level. In other words, although Proposition 187 is largely 
remembered as a benefit-restricting measure, it is its anti-sanctuary 
efforts that constitute its most lasting legacy.  
This Essay is organized in three parts. Part I details the anti-sanctuary 
measures of Proposition 187, how they coalesce into a distinct vision of 
 
 11 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
 12 See ROBIN DALE JACOBSON, THE NEW NATIVISM: PROPOSITION 187 AND THE DEBATE 
OVER IMMIGRATION xiv (2008). 
 13 See, e.g., id.; KENT A. ONO & JOHN M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS: RHETORIC, 
IMMIGRATION, AND CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 187 (2002). 
 14 See, e.g., ANDREW WROE, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND IMMIGRATION POLITICS: FROM 
PROPOSITION 187 TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2008). 
 15 See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 
187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1425 (1995). 
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federal-local cooperation, and how this vision led to its downfall in 
federal court. The goal here is to cast Proposition 187 in a new light, 
and to suggest the radical manner in which its drafters sought to reshape 
immigration policies at both the federal and local levels. Part II 
describes Proposition 187’s legacy. The state law may have been 
enjoined because it sought to advance a broad vision of how federal 
immigration enforcement should be carried out. But it was precisely this 
vision of coordinated enforcement that was ultimately adopted into 
federal law. Part III explores Proposition 187’s impact on today’s 
sanctuary and anti-sanctuary debates. It argues that the reason these 
debates have escalated to the forefront of immigration politics is because 
the vision of immigration enforcement that Proposition 187 set forward 
cannot be effectuated through federal law alone; it requires 
complementary policies at the state and local levels. As long as federal 
immigration policies revolve around the type of federal-local 
cooperation that Proposition 187 introduced, states and localities will 
continue to be embroiled in the broader immigration debates.  
I. PROPOSITION 187 AS AN ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW 
A. The Anti-Sanctuary Provisions of Proposition 187 
That Proposition 187 was intended as an anti-sanctuary measure 
should not be surprising given its text. Commentators have long 
emphasized the law’s attempt to “prevent illegal aliens in the United 
States from receiving benefits or public services.”16 But as the preamble 
made clear, the goal was also “to provide for cooperation between the[] 
agencies of state and local government with the federal government, and 
to establish a system of required notification by and between such 
agencies.”17 In other words, Proposition 187 was about more than the 
relationship between immigrants and the state. It was also an attempt 
to redefine the relationship of state and local officials with federal 
immigration authorities.  
Indeed, the goal of federal-local cooperation extends well beyond the 
statement of purpose in the preamble; it was written right into the 
substantive provisions of Proposition 187 itself. Like many state anti-
sanctuary laws that have been enacted since, Proposition 187 contains 
a broad cooperation mandate. Section 4, for examples, begins by stating 
that “[e]very law enforcement agency in California shall fully cooperate 
 
 16 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and 
Reporting (1994), at § 1. 
 17 Id. 
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with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service” with 
respect to individuals under arrest and suspected of being in the country 
without legal authorization.18 What this “full cooperation” entails, or 
what kind of enforcement activities would be required, is not explicitly 
set out. But this appears to have been precisely the point. Given its 
open-ended language, law enforcement officials would be required to 
participate in any federal immigration initiative in which their 
participation is requested, and presumably in any manner desired by 
federal authorities.  
Aside from a broad mandate to cooperate, Proposition 187 also sets 
out a number of specific activities that state and local officials must do 
to support federal immigration enforcement efforts. These include 
verification, reporting, and notification mandates, all of which are 
required regardless of whether participation is requested by the federal 
government. Under Section 4(b), law enforcement officials are required 
to verify the immigration status of anyone under arrest if there is any 
suspicion that they are present in violation of federal immigration 
laws.19 If an immigrant is identified as unauthorized through this 
verification process, Section 4(b) further requires state and local 
officials to report the “apparent illegal status” to federal immigration 
authorities and the state’s Attorney General, along with “any additional 
information that may be requested.”20 In addition, a separate 
notification requirement instructs law enforcement officials to 
specifically tell unauthorized immigrants to “obtain legal status or leave 
the United States.”21 It is worth noting that Proposition 187 did not limit 
these mandates to local law enforcement officials. Indeed, Sections 5 
through 7 extends the verification, reporting, and notification 
requirements to the state state’s social service administrators, healthcare 
providers, and educators.22 
Last, Proposition 187 bans what we would now refer to as sanctuary 
policies. Of course, the cooperation, verification, and reporting 
requirements described above already restricts the ability of local 
governments to limit their participation in federal immigration 
enforcement. But Proposition 187 also explicitly bans policies to that 
effect. Section 4(c) states that any “legislative, administrative, or other 
action by a city, county, or other legally authorized local government 
 
 18 Id. § 4(a). 
 19 See id. § 4(b)(1). 
 20 Id. § 4(b)(3). 
 21 Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 22 See id. §§ 5(c), 6(c), 7(d). 
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entity . . . to prevent or limit the cooperation required by [the 
cooperation mandate] is expressly prohibited.”23 
What is striking about these provisions is how they operate 
independent of the benefit-restricting measures that were touted as the 
core of Proposition 187. To be sure, at the time that Proposition 187 
was introduced, these anti-sanctuary provisions were largely described 
as the means by which benefit-restrictions can be meaningfully 
enforced. It was argued that only by verifying legal status can California 
ensure that governmental benefits like social services, healthcare, or 
public education are not used by unauthorized immigrants. But even if 
this is how these provisions were justified, it is clear that they also stand 
on their own. Benefits can be denied without requiring law enforcement 
to “fully cooperate” with federal immigration officials. Local law 
enforcement officials provide no direct governmental “benefit” that 
would require them to first verify the immigration status of those they 
arrest. Nor is it clear that local sanctuary policies, especially those 
enacted in order to conserve local resources for local priorities, cannot 
operate in tandem with a state policy that denies benefits to 
unauthorized immigrants.  
Understanding Proposition 187 as an anti-sanctuary measure also 
explains why these provisions continue to be copied by the wave of anti-
sanctuary legislation now sweeping the country more than two decades 
later. Few states are now seeking to restrict benefits to unauthorized 
immigrants (in part because the federal government has imposed far 
more sweeping legislation to that effect). But Proposition 187’s anti-
sanctuary provisions have only spread. Cooperation mandates have not 
only become commonplace, but are also increasingly more open-ended. 
An anti-sanctuary law enacted by Alabama in 2015, for example, 
requires law enforcement officials to both “fully comply with and . . . 
support the enforcement of federal [immigration] law . . . .”24 The same 
can be said of Proposition 187’s verification and reporting requirements. 
In fact, the reason why SB 1070 — the infamous anti-immigration 
measure enacted by Arizona in 2010 — was dubbed the “show me your 
papers” law25 was because it requires law enforcement officials to 
independently verify the immigration status of anyone they encounter 
in a “lawful stop, detention or arrest,” and report illegal status to the 
federal government.26 Moreover, sanctuary bans are now an 
 
 23 See id. § 4(c). 
 24 ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(b) (2019). 
 25 See, e.g., DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES 1 (2016). 
 26 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2019). 
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increasingly common feature of state law. And although the scope of 
contemporary sanctuary bans has grown,27 the bans themselves all build 
upon the basic framework set forth by Proposition 187. 
In short, Proposition 187 is, at heart, an anti-sanctuary law. It is an 
anti-sanctuary law because it seeks to eliminate local discretion over 
how and in what circumstances local communities wish to participate 
in federal immigration enforcement. And it does so not only by 
imposing a broad mandate to cooperate with the federal government, 
but also through specific requirements to assume many of the duties of 
federal authorities. This is not to say that the benefit-restricting 
provisions of Proposition 187 are not important. After all, it was these 
provisions that proponents of Proposition 187 touted, and which 
persuaded many California voters. But the manner in which the benefit 
restrictions were to be carried out were also tied to a separate goal of 
promoting an immigration enforcement regime encompassing all levels 
of the federal system.  
B. Reimagining Immigration Enforcement 
Proposition 187, I have argued, established the basic framework for 
the kind of anti-sanctuary laws that have proliferated since its 
enactment. But the significance of Proposition 187 is not just as an anti-
sanctuary law, or even the nation’s first. It is also because Proposition 
187 sought to fundamentally reshape how immigration laws are 
enforced and how policies concerning enforcement are made. First, 
Proposition 187 imagined a system of complementary enforcement in 
which state and local officials could be used to greatly expand the 
enforcement capabilities of the federal government. Federal-local 
cooperation, rather than exclusive federal authority, would serve as 
basic structural framework for our nation’s immigration enforcement 
system. Second, Proposition 187 advanced a vision of immigration 
policymaking in which states, and not just the federal government, 
 
 27 Proposition 187 sought to ban sanctuary policies that limit federal-local 
cooperation with respect to immigrants under arrest. Indiana and Virginia, however, 
now prohibit any policies that restrict the involvement of government officials to 
anything “less than the full extent permitted by federal law.” See IND. CODE § 5-2-18.2-
4 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1409 (2019) (emphasis added). Proposition 187 
targeted sanctuary effectuated through “legislative, administrative and other actions.” 
Contemporary sanctuary bans are increasingly drafted to cover far more, including 
“patterns and practice[s],” “informal, unwritten polic[ies],” and “procedures and 
customs.” See S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 752.053(a)(1) (2019)); IOWA CODE § 825.1 (2018); H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. § 2 (Fla. 2018). 
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would play a central role. After all, if it is through federal-local 
cooperation that immigration enforcement can be expanded, then states 
are well-positioned to mediate that relationship.  
These ideas may now seem commonplace. But it is important to keep 
in mind how radical they might have appeared at the time that 
Proposition 187 was introduced. We take it as a given today that 
expansive immigration enforcement depends on the participation of 
state and local actors. But in the 1990s, federal-local cooperation with 
respect to immigration was just starting to be considered. There was 
little consensus on the legality of state and local officials participating 
in immigration enforcement.28 There were even less agreement on 
whether they should. This is not to say that federal-local cooperation 
was entirely absent. A number of pilot programs had been developing 
since the late 1980s, many of which involved law enforcement agencies 
in California.29 Local officials also reported immigrants to federal 
authorities on an ad hoc basis.30 But as a matter of federal law and 
policy, there were no national programs that formally integrated state 
and local officials into federal enforcement efforts. Nor was there a 
national system available that would allow local officials to take part in 
identifying or removing unauthorized immigrants.  
This is likely why Proposition 187’s requirement to “fully cooperate” 
with the federal government was written in such a broad and open-
ended manner. Efforts to compel or encourage federal-local cooperation 
today tend to refer explicitly to participation in an existing federal 
program, like compliance with federal detainers or participation in 
287(g) agreements.31 But without any program or policy to refer to, the 
drafters of Proposition 187 needed to anticipate the range of formal 
 
 28 See Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of 
Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 7 (1995); Paula Sue Smith, An Argument 
Against Mandatory Reporting of Undocumented Immigrants by State Officials, 29 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 147, 154-55 (1995). 
 29 See, e.g., The Impact of Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on 
Communities Before the Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives, 103d Cong. 319-34 
(1994) (testimony of G.H. Kleinknecht, Associate Commissioner of Enforcement, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing 
Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 
422-33 (1999).  
 30 See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Police Fear Prop. 187 Will Crush Hard-Earned 
Trust, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1994-11-05-mn-58755-story.html [https://perma.cc/42VG-6DE6] (“During the 1992 
riots, the LAPD turned over hundreds of suspected illegal immigrants to the INS.”). 
 31 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-42-102 (2019) (regarding federal detainers); id. 
§ 7-68-105 (regarding 287(g) agreements). 
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programs that might be developed and the different kinds of federal 
request that might be made. And they did so by essentially giving the 
federal government an open-ended invitation to conscript the state’s law 
enforcement officials as they see fit.  
But the drafters of Proposition 187 were also not content to simply 
anticipate the development of federal immigration policies that might 
call upon state or local participation. They wanted to advance federal-
local cooperation as a central operating principle, and to do so directly 
from the state level. As a result, Proposition 187 also needed to address 
the possibility that such a model of immigration enforcement might be 
forestalled by federal reluctance or local opposition. Even if the state’s 
personnel are entrusted to the federal government, there was no 
guarantee that they will be fully or effectively utilized. Moreover, given 
that the vast majority of the state’s governmental officials are under the 
direct control of cities and counties,32 any effort to commandeer them 
on the federal government’s behalf would have to overcome local 
policies that deny their participation. After all, coordinated action in 
our federal system is in many cases a three-way street. A ballot initiative 
like Proposition 187 can bind the state. But to implement a model of 
federal-local cooperation, the law also needed to overcome possible 
resistance both above and below.  
To that end, Proposition 187 goes further than simply requiring “full 
cooperation” by state and local officials. To overcome federal 
reluctance, it imposes verification and notification requirements that 
effectively orders state and local officials to act as immigration 
enforcement agents, and a reporting requirement that seeks to compel 
the federal government to follow the state’s lead. If the federal 
government chooses not to use state and local officials to identify 
unauthorized immigrants, Proposition 187 requires them to take steps 
to identify on their own. States and local governments may not have the 
constitutional authority to deport unauthorized immigrants on their 
own, but those immigrants can still be driven to “self-deport”33 when 
state and local officials instruct them to “obtain legal status or leave the 
 
 32 See, e.g., LISA JESSIE & MARY TARLETON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS: EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY REPORT 2-3 (2014), https://www2.census.gov/ 
govs/apes/2012_summary_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L3P-WRJP]. 
 33 Indeed, this was how then-Governor Pete Wilson described the intended effect 
of Proposition 187’s benefit restrictions as well. See William Safire, Opinion, Self-
Deportation?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at A15. For earlier state efforts to encourage 
“self-deportation,” see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 218 (2007). 
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United States.”34 All the while, the reporting requirement allows 
California to maintain political pressure on the federal government to 
“do their job.” Proposition 187 cannot directly compel the federal 
government to deport unauthorized immigrants that state and local 
officials identify. But federal authorities might nevertheless be spurred 
into taking action, which appears to be what the verification and 
reporting requirements aimed to do.  
Having addressed the relationship between the federal government 
and the state, Proposition 187 turns to the thorny issue of the state’s 
own local governments. Local sanctuary policies were relatively rare at 
the time. But the few that existed were a major concern for the law’s 
sponsors. Years before Proposition 187 was proposed, one of its key 
supporters openly criticized sanctuary policies like Special Order 40 in 
Los Angeles.35 And during the campaign for Proposition 187, a 
spokesperson for one of its organizational sponsors argued that “[i]t’s 
cities like San Francisco,” which had “declared itself a sanctuary for 
illegal immigrants . . . that make referendums like [this] necessary.”36 
As a result, Proposition 187 wields the power that states exercised over 
their localities to compel their participation. Section 4(c) specifically 
preempts any “city, county, or other legally authorized local government 
entity” from “prevent[ing] or limit[ing]” the “fully cooperate” mandate 
contained in Section 4(a).37 Moreover, the preemption applies to 
“legislative, administration, or other actions” that may be taken by a 
local government or its officials.38 In other words, Proposition 187 
limits the discretion that local governments have traditionally enjoyed 
with respect to directing the activities of their officials, or setting the 
law enforcement priorities for their communities. And to the extent 
local governments implement policies limiting the circumstances when 
or manner in which local officials may check the immigration status of 
immigrants they encounter, those policies are preempted by Proposition 
187’s verification and reporting requirements.  
 
 34 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and 
Reporting (1994), § 4(b)(2). 
 35 See Mary Ann Milbourn, Sanctuary Resolution ‘Ridiculous,’ INS Says, DAILY NEWS 
L.A., Nov. 27, 1985, at 1; see also Harold W. Ezell, Blow to INS Bashers, MERCURY NEWS, 
May 20, 1987, at 15B (criticizing the church-led sanctuary movement).  
 36 Mi Young Pae, S.F. Panel Opposes Prop. 187, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1994, at A17. 
 37 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and 
Reporting (1994), at § 4(c). 
 38 Id. 
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C. The Legal Challenge Against Proposition 187 
Proposition 187 was not just an anti-sanctuary law. As the nation’s 
first, it was also intended to fundamentally reshape the baseline 
presumption with respect to how immigration responsibilities should 
be allocated among the various levels of our federal system. This, I have 
argued, is why Proposition 187 was a radical proposal at the time that it 
was introduced. Yet it was also this “reimagining” of our nation’s 
response to illegal immigration that led to its downfall. In League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,39 District Court Judge Pfaelzer 
enjoined major parts of Proposition 187 for infringing on the federal 
government’s plenary power over immigration, and thus violating the 
Constitution’s supremacy clause. The problem was not that Proposition 
187 directly conflicted with any provision of federal law. Rather, it was 
that the initiative’s effort to fundamentally reshape how immigration 
enforcement was carried out ran afoul of the federal government’s 
exclusive authority to establish its own immigration enforcement policy.  
Indeed, despite all the attention paid to Proposition 187’s benefit 
restrictions, nearly every one of these provisions survived the initial 
rounds of legal challenges. Drawing upon De Canas v. Bica,40 in which 
the United States Supreme Court explained that not “every state 
enactment which in any ways deals with aliens is a regulation of 
immigration and thus per se preempted,” Judge Pfaelzer held that 
California had the right to withhold the state’s own resources from 
unauthorized immigrants. And even if the “denial of benefits . . . may 
indirectly or incidentally affect immigration by causing such persons to 
leave the state or deterring them from entering California in the first 
place, such a denial does not amount to a ‘determination of who should 
or should not be admitted in the country,’”41 which remains a sphere of 
exclusive federal authority. As a result, California was permitted to deny 
social services, state-funded healthcare, and even post-secondary public 
education to unauthorized immigrants. The only benefit that could not 
be denied was primary and secondary education, which the Supreme 
Court had recognized as a right of all children in Plyler v. Doe.42 But that 
injunction was expected; it was intended all along that Proposition 187 
 
 39 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 40 424 U.S. 351 (1975). 
 41 Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 770 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355). 
 42 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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was to be used as a vehicle to compel the Court to reconsider its holding 
in Plyler.43 
Where Proposition 187 ran into trouble was with respect to its anti-
sanctuary provisions, and more specifically the cooperation, 
verification, and reporting mandates. Of course, concerns about these 
provisions were extensively raised during the political campaign leading 
up to the vote on the ballot initiative. Critics argued that it would lead 
to the establishment of a “police state” in California.44 They feared that 
with little to go on, state and local officials will rely on racial profiling 
in deciding when Proposition 187’s verification requirement needed to 
be implemented.45 And these criticisms came not only from immigrant 
advocates, but also from federal and local officials. Doris Meissner, 
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
questioned the use of the police in immigration enforcement operations, 
while Attorney General Janet Reno argued that “[i]t does not make 
sense to turn schoolteachers and nurses into Border Patrol agents.”46 
Local officials from across the state issued public statements against 
Proposition 187 as well,47 with some police departments going as far as 
to suggest that they might refuse to comply with its enforcement 
mandates entirely.48  
But for Judge Pfaelzer, it was ultimately the novel vision of federal 
immigration enforcement underlying Proposition 187 that ran afoul of 
constitutional constraints. Taken on their own, none of the anti-
sanctuary provisions were explicitly preempted by federal law. Yet taken 
as a whole, Judge Pfaelzer concluded that they constituted a 
“comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the 
removal of illegal aliens.”49 This California could not do. By requiring 
state and local officials to make an independent determination of an 
individual’s immigration status, the court explained, California was 
infringing upon powers that the Constitution and Congress “exclusively 
reserved” for federal officials.50 The only context where state and local 
 
 43 See, e.g., WROE, supra note 14, at 80. 
 44 See, e.g., ONO & SLOOP, supra note 13, at 83-84. 
 45 See, e.g., John SW Park, Note, Race Discourse and Proposition 187, 2 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 175, 184 (1996). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See WROE, supra note 14, at 71-73; Patrick J. McDonnell, L.A. Police Panel Joins 
Foes of Measure, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at B4. 
 48 See Park, supra note 45, at 185.  
 49 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 50 Id. at 770. 
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verification would be permitted, according to the court, was in the 
limited cases where a federal program for immigration status 
verification already existed. Nor was it permissible for Proposition 187 
to deny those “suspected” or “reasonable suspected” of being 
unauthorized from receiving governmental benefits. As Judge Pfaelzer 
explained, the “reasonably suspects” language effectively creates a 
separate category of immigrants distinct from those that have been 
actually determined to be in this country illegally; only Congress can 
create new immigration categories in this manner.51 
Contrary to conventional accounts then, Proposition 187 did not fail 
constitutional scrutiny because it sought to deny benefits to 
unauthorized immigrants. The voters who enacted Proposition 187 may 
have been motivated by its benefit-restricting measures. But it was its 
anti-sanctuary provisions that were deemed unconstitutional, and more 
specifically because they coalesced into a “comprehensive scheme” of 
federal-local cooperation over immigration.  
II. THE ANTI-SANCTUARY LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 187 
More than an effort to deny governmental benefits to unauthorized 
immigrants, I have argued that Proposition 187’s goal was also to 
effectuate a model of immigration enforcement based on federal-local 
cooperation. It was this effort to create a “comprehensive scheme” for 
the identification, reporting, and removal of unauthorized immigrants 
that led to Proposition 187’s downfall. Yet, as I argue here, it was also 
this “comprehensive scheme” that proved to be Proposition 187’s most 
lasting legacy.  
This Part describes how federal law and policy were transformed in 
response to Proposition 187. The ballot initiative’s influence can be seen 
in the comprehensive immigration reforms adopted by Congress in 
1996. Its vision also underlies many of the enforcement initiatives that 
were developed by the federal government in the years following 
Proposition 187’s introduction. My claim here is not just that the federal 
government copied Proposition 187’s anti-sanctuary provisions into 
federal law. It is also that subsequent federal reforms paralleled, 
supported, and complemented state laws like Proposition 187. As a 
result, instead of displacing state anti-sanctuary efforts, the federal 
response to Proposition 187 made the proliferation of laws like it even 
more necessary.  
 
 51 See id. at 779. 
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A. Reshaping Federal Law 
Proposition 187’s influence on federal law can most readily be seen in 
the comprehensive immigration reforms adopted by Congress in 1996. 
That year, alongside landmark reforms to the criminal justice system,52 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibilities Act (“IIRIRA”)53 and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).54 Like Proposition 
187, IIRIRA was an effort to curtail illegal immigration. Congress also 
made clear its intent to “remove the incentive for illegal immigration 
provided by the availability of public benefits”55 through restriction 
imposed by PRWORA. And politically, Proposition 187 figured 
prominently in the enactment of both laws. In congressional hearing 
and floor debates, the “lesson” of Proposition 187 was endlessly invoked 
as a justification for drastic federal action on immigration. 
The many ways that IIRIRA reformed federal immigration law is 
beyond the scope of this Essay. For our purposes here, what stands out 
is the extent to which Congress embraced the cooperative vision of 
immigration enforcement that Proposition 187 set out. IIRIRA laid the 
legal foundations at the federal level for implementing the kinds of 
cooperation, verification, and reporting activities that Proposition 187 
sought to carry out at the state level. It did so by making it clear that 
federal law now welcomed local participation, thus removing the legal 
constraints that led to Proposition 187’s injunction. In various 
provisions of IIRIRA, Congress also created a federal “interface” that 
addressed many of the administrative challenges that state and local 
officials faced if Proposition 187 was to be enforced. In other words, if 
California extended an invitation to the federal government to 
undertake a new era of federal-local collaboration over immigration, 
Congress accepted that invitation in 1996 by meeting the state halfway. 
Indeed, what is remarkable about IIRIRA is the degree to which it 
complements Proposition 187 by specifically addressing its legal 
limitations and administrative shortfalls. If one of the reasons 
Proposition 187 was enjoined was because immigration enforcement is 
 
 52 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 53 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 54 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 55 Id. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260. 
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a power that is “exclusively reserved” in the federal government,56 
Congress made clear its ability and desire to delegate that authority. 
Adding section 287(g) to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
IIRIRA created a process by which the federal government could train 
and deputize state and local officials as federal immigration agents.57 
Deputization under this section requires a formal agreement between 
the federal government and a law enforcement agency. But having done 
so, state and local law enforcement officials are not only provided the 
legal authority to act as federal officials, but also resources previously 
available only to federal immigration authorities. 
Through IIRIRA, Congress also responded to concerns that 
Proposition 187’s enforcement mandates were impractical because state 
and local officials lacked the training and resources to identify 
unauthorized immigrants on their own. To that end, IIRIRA established 
a formal process by which state and local officials can count on federal 
assistance in verifying immigration status. In fact, Congress explicitly 
made such assistance mandatory on the federal government itself, 
limiting the discretion ordinarily exercised by administration officials. 
Section 1373 states that federal immigration authorities “shall respond 
to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to 
verify . . . [the] immigration status of any individual . . . by providing 
the requested verification or status information.”58 To carry out this 
mandate, the federal government established the Law Enforcement 
Support Center, which provides “immigration status, identity 
information, and real-time assistance to local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies . . . 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a 
year.”59 In this respect, Section 1373 of IIRIRA is a mirror image of 
 
 56 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 770 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2019). 
 58 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2019). Congress also made clear that no formal agreement 
on the employee of a state or local government to “communicate” or “otherwise to 
cooperate” with the federal government in immigration enforcement matters, including 
the “reporting . . . identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not 
lawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 1357(g). 
 59 Law Enforcement Support Center, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/lesc (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PKM7-STZD]. 
Although IIRIRA created the mandate that led to the implementation of this system, the 
system itself had been proposed by federal officials long before then. See The Impact of 
Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d 
Cong. 30 (1993-1994) (discussing “an initiative which came out of the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act and which Attorney General Barr approved in the final months of his 
administration and that is, INS has proposed to establish a criminal alien tracking center 
  
2020] The First Anti-Sanctuary Law 1999 
Proposition 187’s cooperation mandate. If Proposition 187 conscripts 
state and local officials on behalf of the federal government, IIRIRA 
conscripts federal officials on behalf of the state and local governments.  
Lastly, Congress, too, felt it necessary to address the prospect that law 
enforcement officials, largely under the control and supervision of local 
governments, might be constrained by local policies. To that end, the 
1996 reforms included a ban on local sanctuary policies that both 
mirrored and went beyond the one included in Proposition 187. Section 
1373 prohibits any policies that “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any 
governmental entity or official from sending to, or receiving from” 
federal immigration authorities immigration-related information. In 
addition, no policies can restrict any official from “maintaining such 
information,” or “exchanging such information with any other Federal, 
State, or local government entity.”60 That Congress did not require 
verification and reporting directly makes sense, given that such 
mandates would likely run afoul of the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine, which forbids the federal government from 
directly conscripting state and local officials to implement federal 
laws.61 But Congress tried to reach a similar outcome by prohibiting 
state and local officials from enacting policies that would limit such 
cooperation.62 And despite being upheld by a federal court shortly after 
it was enacted,63 some courts are now holding that Section 1373’s anti-
 
that would operate 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; it would be for the 
specific purpose of providing a response to queries from State and local police 
concerning a suspected alien, aggravated felon, or narcotic offender in custody”). 
 60 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (2019). 
 61 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 943 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992). In these two cases, the Supreme Court held that the 
Tenth Amendment and federalism principles of the Constitution barred the federal 
government from commandeering the state legislative process, or conscripting state and 
local officials from carrying out federal programs. 
 62 There were also signs that some members of Congress wanted to go further to 
compel state and local participation in immigration enforcement. At the time that 
IIRIRA was considered, there were efforts to give the federal anti-sanctuary ban more 
teeth by conditioning federal grants on state and local cooperation in immigration 
enforcement. See, e.g., Proposals for Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration & Refugee Affairs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 45-46 (1994). 
These early proposals mirror the defunding efforts of the Trump administration in 
recent years. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (2017). 
 63 See City of N.Y. v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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sanctuary provision may run still afoul of the anti-commandeering rule 
that Congress tried to avoid after all.64 
Proposition 187 may have never been enforced, but as this Section 
illustrates, its goals carried over into federal law. Congress adopted many 
of Proposition 187’s anti-sanctuary provisions that were struck down as 
preempted. More importantly, Congress embraced the vision of federal-
local cooperation that Proposition 187 outlined, and explicitly enabled 
many of the collaborative pathways that it sought to create. The 
connection is not coincidental. As the legislative records surrounding 
IIRIRA reveal, congressional representatives had California’s ballot 
initiative in mind when they wrote and debated the 1996 reforms. And 
that influence persists today. We may still be debating the wisdom of 
conscripting local law enforcement officials into federal immigration 
enforcement efforts. That debate, however, is now framed almost entirely 
around the model that Proposition 187 introduced, and the specific 
manner in which it had influenced the development of federal law. 
B. Reshaping Federal Enforcement 
If one legacy of Proposition 187 is in federal law, another is in the 
various “operations” developed by federal immigration authorities. 
Recall that one of the most expansive provisions of Proposition 187 was 
its requirement that state and local government officials “fully 
cooperate” with federal immigration enforcement efforts. I noted that at 
the time it was enacted, it was difficult to define what such cooperation 
entailed because there were no established formal programs integrating 
local officials into federal immigration enforcement efforts. That quickly 
changed, however, in the years following Proposition 187’s enactment 
and the 1996 immigration reforms.  
Indeed, nearly every major interior enforcement initiative since 2000 
has been designed with federal-local collaboration in mind. Operation 
Community Shield, for example, expanded existing anti-gang task 
forces consisting of federal, state, and local officials to specifically target 
immigrant gangs by leveraging criminal and civil immigration laws.65 
Since 2005, such task forces have carried out a number of neighborhood 
raids and sweeps that have picked up criminal immigrants alongside 
 
 64 See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866-73 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of 
Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 329-31 (E.D. Pa. 2018); County of Santa Clara 
v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1215-16 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 65 See Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 327-29 (2007). 
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those who were simply present in the United States without 
authorization.  
Operation Secure Communities, initiated in 2008, instituted an even 
closer and more enduring link between local law enforcement and 
federal immigration officials. Launched at first as a voluntary program, 
jail and prison officials were provided the opportunity to submit the 
fingerprints of immigrants to the federal government to cross-check 
against known immigration violators.66 This greatly expanded the 
ability of the federal government to detect unauthorized immigrants by 
screening those who come into contact with local law enforcement. 
Many communities were initially eager to participate in Secure 
Communities, especially as a way of identifying unauthorized 
immigrants who had been arrested for serious and violent crimes. But 
when it was announced that Secure Communities would no longer be a 
voluntary program, and that all fingerprints processed through the FBI’s 
database would be shared with immigration officials, many 
communities voiced their opposition.67 This led Secure Communities to 
be formally suspended during the later years of the Obama 
administration, though the practice of cross-checking fingerprints still 
persisted.68 Soon after his inauguration, President Trump formally 
reinstated Secure Communities.69  
But the operational logistics of Secure Communities also led to other 
programs that required further local involvement. One such program is 
the issuance of federal detainers. Having flagged a suspected 
unauthorized immigrant through Secure Communities or other means, 
federal officials needed a way to ensure that individual could be 
transferred into federal custody. To do that, it was often necessary for 
local law enforcement officials to keep that individual in their custody 
until such a transfer can actually take place. As a result, the federal 
 
 66 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 228 (2016); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State 
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 
23 (2016).  
 67 See Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/ice-to-
expand-secure-communities-program-in-mass-and-ny.html [https://perma.cc/MK7H-
RYS9]. 
 68 See ANGELA S. GARCÍA, LEGAL PASSING: NAVIGATING UNDOCUMENTED LIFE AND 
LOCAL IMMIGRATION LAW 103 (2019). 
 69 See Farah Stockman & J. David Goodman, Trump Immigration Policies Pose Conflict 
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government began issuing “detainers” instructing local law enforcement 
officials to hold a particular individual for up to forty-eight hours after 
the time they would ordinarily be released from state custody.70 Further, 
the federal government began demanding access to state and local 
facilities in order to assume custody of a suspected individual or to 
conduct further investigations.71 Though detainers have now been 
legally construed by courts as mere “requests” that state or local 
governments can choose to honor or ignore,72 many state and local 
officials initially considered them to be binding obligations.  
Proposition 187’s vision of expanding immigration enforcement 
through local participation was realized in large part by the 
implementation of Secure Communities. Not only did a formal program 
now exist whereby the “full cooperation” requirement is given form, but 
reporting and verification by local officials was both automated and 
difficult to avoid given how central the FBI fingerprint database has 
become to everyday law enforcement activities. Indeed, when it comes 
to interior enforcement, the federal government is now almost entirely 
reliant on local involvement in effectuating removals. In recent years, 
the Secure Communities program itself has contributed to the removal 
of more than 80% of all immigrants deported from the nation’s interior.73 
Not only has this greatly expanded the interior enforcement capabilities 
of federal immigration enforcement, as the sponsors of Proposition 187 
wanted, but it has also allowed the federal government to outsource 
much of its costs. When Proposition 187 was proposed, budget analysts 
predicted that its verification and reporting requirements might cost 
tens of millions on an ongoing basis, and perhaps more than 100 million 
in the first year.74 Though Secure Communities and detainers involve 
 
 70 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2019). 
 71 See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278-79 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(describing federal effort to condition federal grant on being granted access to state and 
local facilities for immigration enforcement purposes). 
 72 See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F. 3d 634, 640-41 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 73 Interior deportation numbers decreased from 2012 to 2017, but the share of those 
connected to the Secure Communities program increased. In 2015, for example, out of 
69,478 deportations from the interior, 60,105 were identified through the Secure 
Communities program (86.5%). In 2017, out of 81,603 interior deportations, 67,792 
were identified through Secure Communities (83%). In contrast, less than half of 
interior deportations were connected to Secure Communities in 2012 (83,578 out of 
180,970). See Deportations Under ICE’s Secure Communities Program, TRAC REP. (Apr. 
25, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/ [https://perma.cc/P3G7-SN7Y]. 
 74 See Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification 
and Reporting. Initiative Statute: Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney 
General (1994), available at https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=2103&context=ca_ballot_props [https://perma.cc/YEP6-UCNF].  
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only law enforcement officials, recent estimates peg the cost to state and 
local governments in California alone to be approximately $65 million 
a year.75  
Perhaps even more important than how federal operations and 
initiatives have reshaped immigration enforcement, however, is how 
they have reshaped the political rhetoric around the role of states and 
localities. When Proposition 187 was enacted, the thought of formally 
incorporating states and local officials into federal immigration 
enforcement was perceived as extraordinary. It was precisely because it 
would be extraordinary that the sponsors of Proposition 187 pushed it 
as a ballot initiative in California, and urged it as a model for other 
states. But since then, federal-local participation is widely considered to 
be the default baseline — a basic and necessary component of our 
nation’s immigration enforcement strategy. And this view has prevailed 
despite the fact that the federal government’s ability to mandate local 
participation in federal immigration enforcement is constitutionally 
limited.76 In contrast, it is now the cities and counties seeking to 
extricate themselves from immigration that are viewed as extraordinary. 
Moreover, this view is increasingly shared by not only the critics of local 
sanctuary policies, but also its supporters. Again, if Proposition 187 was 
radical for offering a new model of federal immigration enforcement, it 
is worth noting how that radical vision has become the accepted norm.  
C. Reshaping State Involvement 
As noted earlier, the anti-sanctuary torch of Proposition 187 is now 
carried by other states. In the past several years, waves of anti-sanctuary 
legislation have been enacted at the state level. In their basic structure, 
they continue to mirror that of Proposition 187, from the broad 
cooperation requirement and specific mandates to the ban on local 
sanctuary policies. Yet recent state anti-sanctuary laws have also gone 
further, especially with regards to the rise of punitive provisions that 
dramatically increase the penalties for localities and officials that fail to 
comply.  
This is not to say that Proposition 187 did not spur other states to act 
in its immediate aftermath. A wave of copycat legislation arose on the 
 
 75 See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, THE COST OF STATE & LOCAL 
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3 (2014) [https://perma.cc/ZS9N-GKG5]; 
JUDITH A. GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, THE COST OF RESPONDING TO IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS IN CALIFORNIA (2012), https://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/ 
cost-responding-immigration-detainers-california [https://perma.cc/A257-EESH]. 
 76 See, e.g., City of Chi. v Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir. 2018); County of 
Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 525-26 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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heels of Proposition 187’s enactment. Arizona, Florida, and New York 
proposed legislation that copied its “fully cooperate” provision.77 
Similar reporting and verification mandates were proposed in 
Minnesota, Virginia, and Oregon.78 Legislators in New York introduced 
a bill prohibiting local sanctuary policies mirroring the one in 
Proposition 187.79 In states that provided for ballot initiatives, similar 
grassroots efforts emerged. None of these efforts, however, proved 
successful. Perhaps public support outside of California was not as 
strong. Perhaps the legal challenges that Proposition 187 faced deterred 
lawmakers in other states. Or perhaps political energy was redirected 
towards federal reform efforts that would eventually culminate in 
IIRIRA.  
But starting in the late 2000s, state anti-sanctuary laws proliferated, 
and their enactment follows the federal developments described above. 
As federal reliance on local participation increased in the mid- to late-
2000s, more and more local governments chafed against the new 
demands and began adopting sanctuary policies to limit their 
involvement. As sanctuary policies became more common and begun to 
attract national attention, states stepped in to ban them and mandate 
participation. Oklahoma and Missouri passed anti-sanctuary legislation 
in 2007 and 2008 respectively.80 Arizona’s SB 1070 was enacted in 
2010.81 Alabama followed with similar legislation a year later.82 And in 
recent years, states like Texas, Tennessee, and Florida have joined the 
wave.83 And like Proposition 187, these laws are based around the idea 
that states needed to take the lead once again — not only to compel 
more federal enforcement, but also to foreclose local opposition. 
Given these developments, it is worth reflecting on the degree to 
which contemporary anti-sanctuary measures make sense precisely 
because Proposition 187’s success in reshaping federal law and 
enforcement policies. If Proposition 187’s cooperation mandate seemed 
broad and perhaps vague in its requirements, similar mandates are now 
 
 77 See S.B. 262, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); S.B. 1043, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 1996); A.B. 9113, 219th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995). 
 78 See H.B. 1268, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1996 Va.); H.B. 249, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Minn. 1995); H.B. 2933, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995). 
 79 See A.B. 9112, 219th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995). 
 80 See H.B 1804, 52st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ok. 2007); H.B. 1549, 1771, 1395, & 2366, 
94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008). 
 81 See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 2010). 
 82 See H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Al. 2011). 
 83 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.053(a)(1) (2017); S.B. 168, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
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largely understood to refer to specific federal initiatives like detainer 
requests and established task forces. If questions were initially raised 
about the ability of state and local officials to comply with Proposition 
187’s verification and reporting requirements, those concerns are now 
largely alleviated by the availability of federal assistance in verifying 
immigration status, and the establishment of a federal infrastructure to 
receive and act on local reporting.  
Moreover, reforms to federal law and policies have largely addressed 
the legal concerns that initially led to Proposition 187’s injunction. 
Through IIRIRA, Congress made clear that state and local participation 
neither conflicted with nor frustrated the federal scheme of immigration 
enforcement; rather, such participation was explicitly welcomed and 
encouraged. Thus, when the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of Arizona’s SB 1070, it specifically referred to the 1996 
immigration reforms in upholding anti-sanctuary provisions that 
mirrored those enjoined in Proposition 187.84 Thus, if anti-sanctuary 
laws are now proliferating, it is because they are precisely the kind of 
state laws that the federal government sought to encourage in the 
aftermath of Proposition 187.  
Indeed, in many cases, state anti-sanctuary laws today seem 
specifically designed to overcome the legal limits that federal anti-
sanctuary efforts have faced. Because the federal government cannot 
directly commandeer state and local officials to carry out federal 
immigration enforcement, states are needed to do so on its behalf. As 
the Trump administration has struggled to defund sanctuary cities by 
denying them federal grants, states are stepping in with even more 
defunding punitive measures that would deny all state aid. And while 
the federal government’s anti-sanctuary efforts have been stalled by legal 
challenges, state anti-sanctuary measures like SB 4 in Texas have 
escaped relatively unscathed.85 It would appear today that the heart of 
the anti-sanctuary movement is once again centered over states, much 
like it was at the time that Proposition 187 was enacted. 
And with that, it appears that the vision of federal-local cooperation 
that Proposition 187 proposed for immigration enforcement has also 
become the model for anti-sanctuary legislation. Through Proposition 
187, California prompted and encouraged complementary anti-
sanctuary legislation at the federal level in order for laws like 
Proposition 187 to work. The enactment of those complementary 
 
 84 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 413-15 (2012). 
 85 See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 180 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding SB 
4 from federal preemption challenges, among others). 
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legislation at the federal level in turn spurred more states to pursue more 
anti-sanctuary measures — not only because they are more effective as 
a result of these federal reforms, but also because state laws became 
more necessary in order to fill the gaps that federal law cannot reach. 
This too, then, is the legacy of Proposition 187.  
III. PROPOSITION 187 AND THE SANCTUARY / ANTI-SANCTUARY DEBATE 
Proposition 187 was not only the nation’s first immigration law, but 
was also responsible for the vision of federal-local cooperation that has 
become the centerpiece of our nation’s approach to immigration 
enforcement. This is perhaps Proposition 187’s most lasting legacy, 
reflected not only in the development of federal and state laws, but also 
the sanctuary/anti-sanctuary framing that now dominates the 
immigration debates. This Part offers further reflections on how this 
legacy has shaped the contemporary debate over sanctuary and anti-
sanctuary policies. In addition, it comments on how the “success” of 
Proposition 187 has influenced the nature of immigration advocacy, 
both in favor and against increased interior enforcement. 
A. The Continuing Role of States 
First, Proposition 187 solidified the role of states in federal 
immigration policymaking. For immigration advocates, it demonstrated 
the efficacy of using states as a platform to influence federal policies. 
More importantly, the cooperative model of immigration enforcement 
that Proposition 187 pushed, and which the federal government 
embraced, further amplified the role of states in the development of 
federal enforcement strategies. As the federal government became more 
reliant on state and local participation in immigration enforcement, 
state governments effectively became permanent partners in federal 
enforcement programs. As a result, this reliance created a political 
environment in which states wield an outsized influence on the ability 
of the federal government to expand immigration enforcement efforts 
in the nation’s interior. 
Of course, none of this is to say that Proposition 187 was unique in 
its influence on federal policy. Since the beginning of federal 
immigration regulations in the late nineteenth century, state laws have 
served as templates for federal laws.86 Indeed, Proposition 187 wasn’t 
even the first California law to play this role. California’s efforts to 
restrict and expel Chinese immigrants served as the template for federal 
 
 86 Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1359 (2013). 
  
2020] The First Anti-Sanctuary Law 2007 
restrictions on contract laborers, prostitutes, and eventually the nation’s 
first race-based immigration ban.87 In the early twentieth century, 
California pioneered the use of “alienage” regulations that limited the 
governmental rights and privileges of non-citizens, which led to similar 
restrictions at the federal level.88 And just two decades before 
Proposition 187 was enacted, California passed an employer restriction 
law targeting unauthorized immigrants. This law was not only upheld 
by the Supreme Court,89 but went on to become one of the centerpieces 
of the 1986 federal immigration overhaul. From this perspective, much 
of the nation’s immigration policies — from the Chinese Exclusion Act 
to employer verifications — can be directly tied to laws and policies 
enacted first in California. 
Even in this historical context, however, Proposition 187 stands out. 
And not simply because of the widespread national attention that it 
garnered, but also because of the governmental relationship that it 
formed between the federal, state, and local governments in the federal 
system. Earlier state laws on immigration were deemed successful if 
they were eventually replicated and replaced by federal law. Thus, when 
the federal government enacted employer restrictions in the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,90 Congress explicitly 
preempted any similar laws at the state level, including the California 
law that it copied.91  
The federal response to Proposition 187, however, did not seek to 
displace state and local officials, or state laws, in the same way. Rather, 
the cooperative framework that arose was premised on state and local 
participation, and of the kind that Proposition 187 sought to mandate. 
In other words, unlike previous state laws on immigration, the federal 
adoption of Proposition 187 as an enforcement model did not render 
state anti-sanctuary laws like Proposition 187 superfluous and 
unnecessary. Instead, it made them more important. For the cooperative 
model to work, it was not only necessary for laws like Proposition 187 
to exist, but also that it spreads to all of the other states. 
This explains why even as federal attention to immigration 
enforcement has grown in recent decades, state and local regulations 
concerning immigration have expanded as well. California voters may 
have enacted Proposition 187 in order to send a message to the federal 
 
 87 See id. at 1361. 
 88 See id. at 1360. 
 89 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1975). 
 90 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 91 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2019). 
  
2008 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:1983 
government about the need for immigration enforcement.92 But one 
effect of the federal response is that every state and locality is now forced 
to develop policies on their willingness to dedicate resources to 
immigration enforcement, even those that would otherwise refrain from 
involving themselves in immigration policymaking altogether. In turn, 
states and localities have become more crucial as sites for immigration 
advocacy. Proposition 187 itself was propelled to victory in part because 
of the support that it drew from former federal immigration officials and 
national advocacy organizations.93 California provided a platform for 
these officials and organizations to steer the national immigration 
debates after traditional federal forums were closed off. And given the 
success of Proposition 187 as a political strategy, and the manner in its 
success decentralized immigration policymaking, it makes sense that 
immigration advocates have since turned their attention beyond the 
federal government. To contest the perceived inadequacies of the 
Obama administration’s immigration policies, enforcement advocates 
turned to states like Arizona to advance their position.94 To challenge 
the Trump administration’s enforcement excesses, immigrant advocates 
turned to states like California and Illinois, and cities like San Francisco 
and Chicago.95  
Indeed, it is worth reflecting on how Proposition 187 has changed the 
political rhetoric surrounding immigration. At the time it was enacted, 
sanctuary policies hardly figured in the national debate over 
immigration. In fact, the term “sanctuary” was not even widely used to 
describe policies that limited states and localities participation in 
immigration enforcement. One reason for this was that state and local 
cooperation in this federal responsibility was seen largely as 
discretionary — something helpful, but not part of the regulatory 
baseline when it came to immigration. But after Proposition 187 and the 
1996 federal reforms, state and local participation was recast in the 
public’s eye as expected, if not required. The jurisdictions that limited 
their involvement in some way, however limited, became the outlier. 
Those that duly cooperated with all demands of the federal government, 
and in much the same way that Proposition 187 sought to mandate with 
its broad “cooperation” mandate, were understood to be the norm. 
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Hence the “sanctuary” label attached to policies in which states and 
localities limited their participation, despite the fact that such policies 
provide unauthorized immigrants no refuge from federal officials.96 It is 
also why the sanctuary/anti-sanctuary controversy is now considered 
central to our nation’s immigration debate. 
B. Constraining the Role of Localities 
One legacy of Proposition 187 is an expansion of the governmental 
arenas in which immigration policies are made. Yet it can also be argued 
that Proposition 187 pushed in the opposite direction as well: 
narrowing the scope of potential immigration policymakers by 
constraining the role of localities. This is not to say that the sponsors of 
Proposition 187 sought to cut local governments out of immigration 
entirely. If anything, the model of immigration enforcement that they 
endorsed was one in which local officials would play an expanded role. 
But Proposition 187 rested on the concept that local participation could 
be compelled without local support. Instead, the state could mandate it 
directly. In other words, if local officials were central to the expansion 
of federal immigration enforcement, it would be the state that serves as 
their broker.97 
Ironically, at the time that Proposition 187 was being considered, 
California localities were already actively cooperating with the federal 
government on immigration enforcement. For proponents of 
Proposition 187, early sanctuary policies like those in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco loomed large. But as noted earlier, in the years before 
Proposition 187’s enactment, the federal government had fostered a 
strong working relationship with city and county law enforcement 
officials in the state, including their participation in several federal pilot 
programs that were eventually expanded nation-wide. Nor were local 
sanctuary policies as restrictive as critics made them out to be. For 
example, Special Order 40 in Los Angeles permitted local involvement 
 
 96 The “sanctuary” label was first used to refer to the church-led movement to insulate, 
quite physically, Central American refugees from deportation in the 1970s and 1980s. See 
generally SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND THE U.S. 
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993). Besides the religious and historic connections, “sanctuary” 
made sense there because the churches were seeking to block federal officials from 
apprehending unauthorized immigrants in their care, as they are once again doing today. 
See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Immigrant Shielded From Deportation by Philadelphia Church 
Walks Free, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us/sanctuary-
church-immigration-philadelphia.html [https://perma.cc/ME63-CBQK]. 
 97 See supra Part I.B. 
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in immigration enforcement in a large number of situations.98 Through 
their participation in federal pilot programs, and in circumstances 
permitted by existing sanctuary policies, localities in California were 
cooperating with federal officials. Yet, in both of these cases, it was the 
localities themselves — motivated by local concerns and guided by the 
interests of their local constituency — that decided the manner and 
circumstances in which local resources would be allocated to 
immigration enforcement. It was local officials that negotiated those 
terms with federal officials. Proposition 187 then did not simply seek to 
insert states into immigration policymaking, it also sought to insert 
states into this federal-local relationship. In other words, Proposition 
187 aimed to sever the federal-local relationship that had been building 
with respect to immigration enforcement in California and substitute a 
federal-state relationship in its stead. 
Moreover, by insisting that states play a role in brokering the federal-
local relationship, Proposition 187 offered the federal government a 
partial solution to one of the biggest obstacles in implementing a 
cooperative model of immigration enforcement. Given that the vast 
majority of law enforcement officials in the country are employed by 
local governments like cities and counties, it is these local officials that 
hold the greatest promise for expanding federal immigration 
enforcement efforts. But because of this patchwork system of law 
enforcement, the federal government faces the daunting task of having 
to negotiate with each and every police or sheriff’s department 
individually. The best they can hope for is a patchwork system of 
cooperation across the country. It would be easier if the federal 
government could simply mandate local participation in immigration 
enforcement through its plenary power over immigration. However, the 
Constitution and our system of federalism also prevents it from 
commandeering local officials directly. The federal government could 
substantially increase the number of immigration agents that operate 
within the nation’s interior. But such an expansion would be at great 
cost, and would still pale in comparison to more than 470,000 sworn 
officers that serve in local police departments and sheriff’s offices.99  
 
 98 See Los Angeles, Cal., Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979) (allowing for 
reporting of unauthorized immigrants if they have been “booked for multiple 
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previously arrested for a similar offense”).  
 99 See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: 
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Instead of negotiating with local governments and law enforcement 
agencies directly, however, Proposition 187 suggested that states can 
mandate local participation on the federal government’s behalf. At the 
very least, states can forbid local policies that would limit their 
participation. After all, local governments are traditionally understood 
in American law as creatures of the state.100 And if the federalism 
principles of the Constitution forbids the federal government from 
“commandeering” local officials as subsidiaries of the sovereign states, 
no such federal constitutional principles protect local officials from 
commandeering by their own state.101 To be sure, state commandeering 
is no substitute for uniform federal mandates. But negotiating with 50 
states is far easier than dealing with the nearly 90,000 local governments 
and more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies across 
the United States.102  
That states might have a strong interest in brokering the participation 
of their local government is not surprising. What is surprising, however, 
is that this form of state intervention began in California. To be sure, as 
“creatures of the state,” local governments have long been understood 
to be especially vulnerable to state regulation and preemption. But 
California was not only one of the many states that had amended its 
constitution to grant “home rule” to their local governments at the turn 
of the twentieth century, but also adopted a particularly strong form that 
prohibited the state from interfering with “municipal affairs.”103 Indeed, 
just two years before Proposition 187 was proposed, the California 
Supreme Court struck down a state law prohibiting public financing of 
local candidates because it was an interference into municipal affairs. 
Few state constitutions, and even fewer state courts, have gone as far as 
California’s in protecting localities from state control, especially when it 
comes to their “sole right to regulate, control, and govern their internal 
conduct independent of [state] laws.”104 Yet through Proposition 187, 
California also became the first state to directly dictate the duties of local 
government officials with respect to immigration, and prohibit local 
governments from regulating, controlling, and governing their officials 
through local policies. Given the demographic and politics shifts at the 
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time, it may not be surprising that California led the charge on 
immigration. But given its constitutional structure and precedents on 
state-local relations, it is surprising that it did so in such a manner. 
Interestingly, localities in California did not raise “home rule” 
concerns in opposition to Proposition 187. This is not to say that local 
opposition to Proposition 187 were absent. Indeed, local governments 
and officials were some of the fiercest critics of the law, and many 
participated in the litigation against the state.105 Moreover, local 
governments and officials raised a host of local concerns with respect to 
Proposition 187’s enforcement mandate — erosion of community trust, 
burden on local resources, harm to immigrant neighborhoods106 — 
many of which have become commonplace arguments in support of 
local sanctuary policies. But what was missing in the initial response 
was any legal assertion that Proposition 187 unconstitutionally 
interfered with local matters by undermining the authority that local 
governments and their constituents exercised over their officials. 
Perhaps local officials did not believe that “home rule” would be a 
winning argument, even in a state like California. Perhaps they believed 
that immigration, a national issue, would be construed by courts as 
more of a matter of statewide concern, rather than a municipal affair. 
Perhaps local officials did not feel such an argument was necessary given 
the more promising federal constitutional claims against Proposition 
187. In any event, the precedent that localities in California established 
in response to Proposition 187 still largely holds. Even as similar anti-
sanctuary laws have been enacted in other “home rule” states, there has 
been little effort by localities to challenge these measures as an 
infringement of local control.  
Ironically, it is against SB 54, California’s sanctuary law, that home rule 
arguments are now being raised. As a matter of policy, Proposition 187 
and SB 54 cannot be more different. Instead of mandating local 
cooperation with federal authorities, SB 54 prohibits it. Instead of 
requiring local actions to be taken with respect to unauthorized 
immigrants, SB 54 bans it. Instead of preempting local sanctuary 
policies, SB 54 establishes such a policy for the entire state. But what SB 
54 and Proposition 187 share is that they both seek to eliminate local 
discretion with respect to immigration enforcement by mandating 
specific local actions (or inaction) and preempting countervailing local 
policies. In response, the City of Huntington Beach is suing the state on 
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the ground that SB 54 unconstitutionally intrudes on their home rule 
powers to govern municipal affairs. It is far too early to know how this 
litigation will end. Yet a district court judge has already issued a 
preliminary injunction against the application of SB 54 to the city.107 
CONCLUSION 
It has been over twenty-five years since Proposition 187 was adopted 
by California voters. At the time it was enacted, its enforcement 
provisions were widely seen as a radical attempt to decentralize our 
nation’s system of immigration enforcement. But had it been enacted 
today, it would have found an immigration system that not only 
supports the kind of state and local participation that it sought to 
effectuate, but also increasingly demands it as a matter of federal law 
and policy. Federal-local cooperation is now welcomed and encouraged. 
Institutional structures now exist to facilitate local verification and 
reporting. Sanctuary is now explicitly denounced as an obstacle to 
federal enforcement.  
It would be easy, of course, to say that Proposition 187 was simply 
ahead of its time. But as this Essay has argued, it was Proposition 187 
itself that was responsible for the transformation that followed. As the 
nation’s first anti-sanctuary law, Proposition 187 cast the mold for the 
anti-sanctuary laws that proliferated in its wake. By proposing a model 
of state and local participation, it highlighted the kinds of federal 
reforms that would be needed to complement similar state efforts going 
forward. Indeed, unlike other state immigration laws that have shaped 
federal law and policies, Proposition 187 led to the creation of a federal 
system that would require continued action by states to conscript local 
officials on the federal government’s behalf. In this regard, Proposition 
187 ensured continued state involvement in the development of 
immigration law and policy.  
Given the degree to which federal immigration enforcement efforts 
have become dependent on state and local participation, it is unlikely 
that states and localities will be disentangled from immigration 
policymaking in the foreseeable future. The federal government plenary 
power over immigration will increasingly be tied up with politics at the 
state and local level. The flip side, however, is that avenues for effective 
advocacy in the immigration arena is decentralized as well. Just as 
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Proposition 187 was effective in shaping federal immigration policy, so 
might laws like SB 54. Only time will tell what the next twenty-five years 
might bring. 
